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Abstract 
The electric power industry in European Union is undergoing profound regulatory and operational 
changes. The underlying rationale behind these transformations is to move only highly monopolized 
vertically-integrated industry from a centralized operation approach to a competitive one. European 
energy liberalization is underway to develop an internal market for electricity. Energy initiatives for EU 
are occurring in conjunction with measures to implement energy efficiency, renewable energy, and 
emissions trading of greenhouse gases. In response to EU Directives and policies and national initiatives, 
the EU market is evolving at the same time as environmental measures for energy are being 
considered. This paper discusses the process by which the countries of the EU have restructured their 
electricity markets. It shows that the restructuring process has focused on legal and organizational 
issues, but it doesn’t contain specific prescription for economic design of the market. Apparently, the 
lack of regulatory framework harmonization is particularly harmful to the economic design of the 
market handling market power problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognized that electricity underpins growth is vitally important to the development and 
welfare of nations. Because of its versatility, convenience, and relative ease of transport, it makes 
possible many of the goods and services that we associate with modern life. Developed nations 
typically have very high levels of electrification, and over the last hundred years electricity has 
gradually replaced other forms of energy to operate industrial and commercial processes, as well as 
becoming increasingly predominant in the household sector. 
Early industry leaders and politicians shared the view that electricity could be most efficiently 
supplied by vertically-integrated monopolies. In the United States, these were largely privately owned 
and operated, with the government playing a role as regulator. In Europe, the electric utilities were 
under state control. In many other nations around the globe, the state assumed the primary 
responsibility for the development and operation of the electricity structure. There were a number of 
historical and practical reasons for this. The state had the ability to raise the capital required, and the 
widespread view that such a strategic asset must be under the control of central government. 
Economies of scale were achieved by building larger and larger generation plants, in tandem with 
transmission and distribution networks that gradually extended to even the most remote consumers. 
Further economies were achieved through additional vertical integration into the upstream energy 
resources sector especially oil, coal and gas. 
Over the last two decades, the old idea that electric power generation, transmission and distribution 
represent a “natural monopoly” best handled centrally, has given way to a general consensus among 
policy-makers, regulators, industry analysts and economists that the generation and retailing elements 
of the power supply industry would be more efficiently delivered by firms operating in freely 
competitive energy markets (Electricity Sector Deregulation, Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, 
March 2000).  
A number of factors have contributed to this change in theoretical stance, and become forces for 
change. In addition to the current focus on economic efficiency, these forces include a shortage of 
capital in rapidly industrializing nations, recent technological and information management 
innovations, emerging global competition, and consumer demand for more sophisticated and 
diversified products and services. 
In a liberalized market, generation and transmission investment decisions are decoupled, so that more 
grid is necessary. The European transmission grid is the backbone of the internal electricity market 
that besides serving the market has to ensure security of supply and to allow connecting renewables. 
Transmission grid investments are clearly needed, especially to increase the scarcely available cross-
border transfer capacities. In this paper it is discussed the regulation that is already in place will 
deliver the investments crucial for the success of the liberalization process in Europe 
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1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
For nearly a century, electricity around the world was typically produced by vertically integrated 
utilities, which operated facilities for all three stages of electricity service: generation, transmission 
and distribution. In many cases, utilities were state-owned monopolies. When private ownership was 
present, the companies nonetheless operated as monopolies in designated franchise areas regulated by 
governments that set rates and oversaw investments (Patterson 1999).  
The main attributes of this monopoly system are that there is no competition and no consumer choice. 
Typically, this system is characterized by the existence of one vertically and horizontally integrated 
entity. In some cases, a number of vertically integrated monopolies may exist, but each has their own 
separate franchise area of operation – usually mandated in law. The monopoly utility owns and 
operates all generation plants, and transmission and distribution networks. It may be under an 
obligation to supply consumers, but consumers for their part are captive and have no choice of 
supplier. The service area may be national in coverage. The utility is usually also tightly regulated – 
usually through price control. 
The involvement of the public sector in the electricity industry is partly explained by the sector’s 
technical and economic evolution. As utilities pursued economies of scale both in supply and in 
demand, electricity systems became highly centralized large scale technological. Creating such a 
network is a highly capital-intensive project with long payback periods (but significant society-wide 
benefits), and, as a result, has required public sector oversight of electricity supply in many countries. 
Even where private firms were active from the outset in the electricity business (e.g. the USA, 
Germany, and Japan), governments have played an important role in building electric networks – 
sometimes as a supporter of, and at other times as a competitor to, private power. 
While electricity systems built by public and/or private monopolies made large-scale production and 
consumption of electricity possible in many parts of the world, their operation also created serious 
problems. For example, large scale hydro-dams, nuclear reactors and coal fired power plants have 
became sources of serious ecological degradation and have crowed out public spending on other social 
projects, especially in developing countries. Too often, important decisions, regarding electricity 
supply were made by a closed circle of technical experts, government bureaucrats, and large corporate 
clients. Such a governance structure, coupled with the monopoly status of utilities, resulted in 
electricity industries development into powerful organizations with their own political and economic 
agendas.  
The shortfalls of a vertically-integrated monopoly structure have really only become evident in recent 
years, and in economies with relatively large and mature electricity supply industries. With 
technological advances allowing for the construction and sitting of smaller-scale generation plants 
closer to demand centers, advances in information technology, the deregulation and development of 
competition in other infrastructural industries, and the realization that the sale of the product can be 
speared from the means of transport, it has become increasingly difficult to sustain the argument that a 
vertically-integrated monopoly structure is the only way of structuring the electricity sector. 
Additionally, the vertical-integrated utilities are identified as companies with political interference in 
decision making process, lack of incentives to improve services and lower costs.  
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2. FORCES FOR CHANGES: TECHNICAL INNOVATION, ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY AND CONSUMER CHOICE 
A number of important factors have contributed to the far-reaching changes in global electricity 
markets. Economic efficiency has been a strong driver. The new neo-classical economic theory 
emerging in the early 1980s insisted that free and competitive markets were more efficient than 
government agencies at delivering basic services, and that divestiture of state-owned assets would 
have flow-on social benefits in terms of improved resource allocation, innovation, and ultimately 
greater employment opportunities. 
By the middle part of the 20th century, electricity was viewed as a national strategic asset, in much the 
same way that coal, and than oil, were viewed. A stable and secure supply of electricity to all 
consumers was considered an essential ingredient of the national infrastructure by the more developed 
economies, and a goal to aim for by the developing economies. Obligations to supply were 
commonplace, along with vertically-integrated and state owned monopolies.  
This view of the electricity sector has undergone significant change. Not only as a result of economic 
pressure to increase economic efficiency through deregulation and restructuring, but also as a result of 
a paradigm shift with respect to the delivery of services – brought on by the information revolution 
and other technological advances. Many leaders in government and industry alike are now recognizing 
that electricity sector deregulation can make it responsive to changes in business and technology, and 
more open to the forces of free-market competition. 
Next to the drive to achieve greater economic efficiency, the greatest force for change is quite 
probably the inexorable advance of technological innovation. In discussing the origin of electricity 
restructuring, many note that recent technology innovation in electricity generation has made obsolete 
the logic of scale economies, which had earlier justified monopoly status for suppliers. Improvements 
in small-scale, natural gas-fired, combustion technology have arguably diminished the economic edge 
that large plants once had.  
In the electricity sector, two important areas of innovation are having a major impact on the industry. 
The first is the development of the natural gas combined cycle turbine (CCGT). With this technology, 
power producers were allowed to operate with higher efficiency. In comparison with the 30-40% 
efficiencies achieved by old single cycle turbines installed 20 years ago, today’s systems are running 
at 50-60% efficiency, and improving with time1. High thermal efficiency means low emission levels, 
and this in turn means that power plants can now be situated closer to centers of demand. 
The second innovation likely to have a major impact on the electricity sector is the electronic 
information revolution. Markets, such as wholesale ones now be operated largely through electronic 
means such as Internet, with buying and selling designed to match demand on a five minute basis 
throughout the day and night. With the ability of market players to have access to real time 
information on all aspects of their operations, and on constantly changing market prices for electricity, 
it is now feasible to operate a disaggregated industry structure with high levels of economic efficiency. 
                                                     
1  Electricity Sector Deregulation, Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, March 2000. 
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If one looks at recent reforms, one prominent feature has been an explosion in technological 
innovation and in the bewildering choice of products and services, consumers can now enjoy. Many 
energy industry experts are now becoming increasingly convinced that change on a similar scale could 
occur in the energy sector once the effects of deregulatory reform become widespread. 
Substantial changes that will bring a wide array of new goods and services to electricity consumers are 
already emerging in economies that have fully deregulated their electricity markets. Already, the 
market power of large industrial electricity consumers is having a significant impact on the behaviour 
of electricity industry participants. As the power to choose between suppliers reaches down to small 
businesses and residential consumers, this will act as a further spur to the development of even more 
goods and services tailored to meet individual needs. Although there are barriers to switching 
suppliers, there is evidence to suggest the new metering technology and a better understanding of the 
market by small consumers will in time lead to true retail competition, and then to further stimulation 
of electricity markets as retailers compete to provide a more diverse and higher quality range of goods 
and services (Bradford 1999).  
3. DERREGULATION OF THE MARKET 
The deregulation of the European electricity sector was launched on December 1996, the date on 
which Directive 96/92/EC - “concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity” was 
adopted. The liberalization aims at increasing efficiency, harmonizing and reducing electricity prices, 
improving public services, cutting reserve production capacities, making a better use of resources, 
giving customers the right to choose their supplier and providing customers with a better service. 
The intension of the Directive was to subdivide the electricity sector into four segments: generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply. The competition had to be introduced in generation and supply 
sectors, whereas transmission and distribution had to remain monopolistic. The principal requirements 
of the Directive were:  
• Integrated companies must keep separate accounts for transmission, distribution, other electricity-
related activities and other non-electricity-related activities. This separation of accounts aims at 
avoiding discrimination, cross-subsidies and distortion of competition; 
• The generation segment should be opened up to competition, either by an authorization procedure 
and/or by a tendering procedure 2;  
• Transmission and distribution remain monopolies. Non-discriminatory rules on access to the 
transmission and distribution networks should be established. Member States can choose between 
regulated third party access (rTPA), negotiated third party access (nTPA) or single buyer model3. 
                                                     
2  Under an authorization procedure, any company may build and operate a new electricity-generating plant,    
provided that it complies with the planning and energy supply criteria for authorization specified in the 
Member State in question. Alternatively, under a tendering procedure, whenever there is a necessity for new 
generating capacity on the basis of regular long-term planning forecasts, an independent body draws up an 
inventory for new means of production and the requisite capacity is allocated by a tendering procedure. 
3  Under a negotiated third party access system, each network user negotiates the terms of access with the 
system operator. With regulated third party access, the tariffs are set in advance by the relevant authorities, 
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The transmission system should be operated by an independent system operator (ISO/TSO) 
responsible for operating, maintaining and developing the network and its interactions; 
• The supply segment is also opened up to competition - “eligible customers” are free to switch 
suppliers. Member States (MS) can provide their own definition of eligible consumer though they 
have to meet minimum requirements (e.g. consumers connected to the transmission grid, 
consumers reached specified annual consumption, etc.);  
• Member States must also designate a competent and independent authority to settle disputes 
relating to the contracts and negotiations. 
The Directive 96/92/EC allowed the countries to choose the regime how to implement proposed 
changes, which corresponds best to their particular situation. The gradual opening introduced by this 
document resulted in significant differences between Member States regarding the level of market 
opening. The existence of negotiated third party access regimes, the level of unbundling obligations 
(lack of legal and management separation) and the lack of an obligation to establish a national energy 
regulator were also viewed as obstacles to create competitive markets. To address these concerns, 
further measures were proposed by the Commission leading to the adoption of Directive 2003/54/EC 
and Regulation No 1228/2003 (“Cross Border Electricity Trading Regulation”).  
The main issues identified by these two documents concerned network access, tarification, market 
power in electricity production and different degrees of market opening between Member States (MS). 
Directive 2003/54/EC, repealing Directive 96/92/EC, provides the main characteristics such as: 
• The timetable for market opening was extended to households;  
• This directive requires legal unbundling as well as management unbundling for network operators; 
• Non-discriminatory access to the networks is based on ex ante fixed access tariffs (i.e. regulated 
third party access); 
• New generation capacity should be developed; 
• Environmental protection and security of supply are included; 
• Fixing rules for the use of the interconnection capacity, supervision of network access tariffs, 
overseeing the level of transparency and competition. 
The Directive 2003/54/EC, where Member States have properly implemented it – not only in form, but 
also in spirit, has significantly contributed to the creation of a common electricity market. According 
to these two documents, there is some experience in electricity market liberalization. The United 
Kingdom (UK) implemented reforms on market opening in the 1980s. Denmark was opening its 
energy markets along with measures for emissions trading and to ensure renewable energy. Germany 
opened its electricity market for this date, and Austria was scheduled shortly thereafter, though the 
market is currently open. France is beginning to open its markets, though EDF, the national French 
monopoly and largest generator in Europe, has been selling into other markets and investing in 
utilities.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
and applied to all users of the network. These tariffs are published. Under the single buyer model, eligible 
customer applies to a legal entity which is responsible for central electricity purchasing and selling. 
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3.1 Unbundling 
One of the main changes introduced by the Directives is to unbundle the vertically integrated sector 
into four segments, i.e. generation, transmission, distribution and supply. The rationale is that, unlike 
generation and supply, transmission and distribution could stay as natural monopolies (with network 
externalities) because of security reasons. Consequently, since competitors in generation and supply 
need access to the networks, the electricity Directives have provided the separation of competitive 
from non-competitive segments, in order to avoid discriminatory access and conflicts of interest.  
Many analysts are concerned that the introduction of competition in some segments (generation and 
supply) might create a downward pressure on prices, than the increased interaction and the need for 
coordination among participants from different segments could raise transaction costs. On the other 
side, the promoters of electricity deregulation implicitly assume that the downward pressure on prices 
resulting from competition (in generation and supply) will largely compensate for transaction costs, 
resulting from interactions between generation, transmission, distribution and supply. 
European legislation requires network segments to be legally separated from competitive segments. 
While the principle of unbundling is simple in theory, it can assume a number of forms, allowing 
different degrees of independence between the unbundled segments. The Directive 96/92/EC 
essentially requested a separation of accounts. This was quickly considered to be insufficient, so that 
the Directive 2003/54/EC strengthened the requirements, imposing a legal separation and minimum 
criteria aimed at ensuring organization and decision making independence4. In most Member States, 
the Transmission System Operator (TSO) today is legally independent unit. In some cases (e.g. the 
Netherlands, UK, Scandinavian countries, Italy, Portugal and Spain), there even is a strict ownership 
separation between the TSO and the competitive players; in most of these cases this means that the 
TSO is state-owned.  
For generation and supply segments, a strict separation between the two activities is not required by 
the Directive. The main development in past few years is the substantial wave of acquisition and 
mergers that took place throughout Europe. By reinforcing their position on both the generation and 
the supply markets, companies hope to be sheltered from market-risk exposure, credit risks and low 
market liquidity. Suppliers have to buy power at uncertain and volatile price. At the same time, they 
often have more or less fixed price contracts with their customers. One way to eliminate the associated 
price risk is by re-integrating with a power producer. Doing so provides the producer with a 
guaranteed output, implying mutual gains. These re-integration movements reduce risk, and as such 
might have a positive impact on costs and prices, and as consequence they are beneficial to consumers.  
                                                     
4  In terms of organization and decision making independence, the rules introduced by the Directive 
2003/54/EC are as follows: 
- those persons responsible for the management of the transmission system operator may not participate 
in company structures of the integrated electricity undertaking responsible, directly or indirectly, for the 
day-to-day operation of the generation, distribution, and supply of electricity; 
- appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the professional interests of the persons responsible 
for the management of the transmission system operator are taken into account in a manner that ensures 
that they are capable of acting independently; 
- the Transmission System Operator shall have effective decision-making rights, independent from the 
integrated electricity undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the 
network. 
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3.2 Transmission 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are responsible for the maintenance and development of their 
transmission networks as well as the interconnections with neighbouring networks, bur also for the 
operational management of their networks. 
The electric power transport can not be compared to transport of other commodities. This is due to the 
fact that electricity has some very specific physical characteristics such as the occurrence of loop 
flows and transport losses. As a consequence, coordination of transport networks will be required but 
this will also have an impact on the geographical spread of the generation capacity. The operational 
management of the network requires close interaction with other market participants. In a deregulated 
market this interaction is supposed to take place through a market mechanism, and in most countries, 
the electricity exchange is a subsidiary of the TSO. 
3.2.1 Market mechanisms 
As rightly pointed out by Rosenburg (1998), the dynamics of current technological development is 
likely to greatly extend the present trend of rising electricity consumption well into the future. As 
electricity gains dominant status in the energy consumption profile, electricity pricing practices will 
play significant roles in economic development, technology development and energy consumption 
behaviour.  
Different pricing practice in the electricity sector has been developed in accordance with changing 
industry structure. While natural monopolies are compatible with a usual cost-of-service pricing 
practice, deregulated markets require more complex pricing mechanisms. Since the extent to which 
markets are deregulated and unbundled could be different in each economy, the pricing mechanism 
may also differ. 
Power exchanges 
The liberalization of the electricity industry has created a need for organized markets at the wholesale 
level. Two mains kind of organized markets have emerged: power pools and power exchanges. The 
difference between two models can be explained by using two criteria: initiative and participation5. A 
power pool is the result of a public initiative (government wants to implement competition at 
wholesale level) and the participation is mandatory (no trade is allowed outside the pool). A typical 
example of this model was the England and Wales pool as it existed before NETA (the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements). A power exchange is launched on a private initiative (for instance 
by a combination of generators, distributors and traders) and its participation is voluntary. This means 
that usually a bilateral market coexists together with the exchange. Nowadays the second model 
appears to be preferred by market players (e.g. Germany, Poland organized markets are based on the 
power exchange model). 
                                                     
5  Congestion management and power exchanges: their significance for a liberalized electricity market and their 
mutual dependence; Working Paper; Francois Boisseleau, Laurens de Vries. 
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As a private initiative, a power exchange aims to be financially profitable and therefore to attract a 
maximum of transactions. To achieve this it must deliver real added value to the market by providing a 
competitive marketplace. Firstly, it is efficient in economics terms by matching supply and demand at 
the lowest price without compromising the reliability of the system. Many buyers and sellers must be 
able to enter and act freely on the spot market. This assumes that there is a minimum level of liquidity 
so that no one can directly influence the market price.  
Since most exchanges work on a day-ahead basis, this means that any participant wishing to supply 
electricity the next day has to send his supply curve for each hour of the next day to the exchange 
authority. Every participant wishing to buy electricity has to send his demand curve as well. The 
exchange authority aggregates all individual supply and demand curves and determines an equilibrium 
price for each hour of the following day. This is called the spot price. 
Due to the specific characteristics of electric power, power exchanges usually consist of multiple 
submarkets. Depending on the maturity of the exchange, some of these submarkets may be lacking. 
There are markets for physical delivery, such as day-ahead market, fine-tuning market and balancing 
market, and financial markets, such as futures and options. Some of them will be explained below. 
The day-ahead market mainly serves planning purposes. Before a certain closing hour each producer 
has to submit price/quantity pairs, indicating the amount of power he intends to inject into the network 
at a certain price. Likewise, buyers have to submit price/quantity pairs, indicating the amount of power 
they intend to buy at that price. After the closing hour, the power exchange aggregates all supply and 
demand curves and determines the equilibrium price. This yields one equilibrium price and quantity 
for each hour of the next day. All transactions are settled at the equilibrium price, called the system 
marginal price (SMP) or the market closing price (MCP).  
Since the day-ahead equilibriums are based on one-day-ahead expectations, and because real-time 
consumption and production depend on a lot of unpredictable factors (e.g. weather conditions, plant 
breakdowns, etc.), some exchanges allow market players to fine-tune their expectations until a few 
hours before actual delivery. The same mechanism allows them to enter bids and offers, although their 
size should be relatively small. This market is called fine-tune market. 
In real time, during the hour of actual delivery, it is the TSO that is responsible for the overall balance 
between supply and demand. In the case of an imbalance, the TSO has to correct it. If there is excess 
demand, then the TSO must increase production or decrease demand. In order to do so, the TSO must 
use the balancing market to buy or sell last-minute power from power producers to keep a continuous 
balance of demand and supply. The TSO can delegate responsibility for this balance to so-called 
Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs). In that case, any producer or consumer having access to the 
transmission network must designate a BRP. Each BRP is responsible for its own overall balance, and 
the TSO regulates the network balance. BRPs and TSO have access to the balancing market, so if the 
TSO has to intervene, it will analyze which BRP caused the imbalance and ask for cost compensation. 
BRPs having their own production plants can use these in order to escape the very volatile balancing 
market price.  
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Congestion management  
The cross-border exchanges have to be managed to maximize competition and to avoid system 
overload in existing interconnection conditions. Congestion is relatively prevalent on interconnectors 
because they were not built to facilitate the current large electricity flows between countries. 
Originally, their main purpose was to allow exchanges between countries for the purpose of system 
stability.  
Many methods exist to handle congestion of power lines, but majority of already implemented 
methods have a problem that they are not economically efficient and the main goal of liberalization is 
just that. This problem is considered in the European Regulation 1228/2003 (“on conditions for access 
to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity”), where it was stated that network congestion 
problems must be addressed with non-discriminatory and market-based solutions.  
Consequently, it has been decided that the allocation of scarce interconnector capacity should be based 
upon some kind of market mechanism. In Europe the following methods are considered the most 
important options such as explicit auctioning, implicit auctioning and market splitting, counter trading, 
and redispatching.  The first group (explicit and implicit auctioning and market splitting) of methods is 
called “congestion pricing methods”, because they use a price mechanism to ration the scarce 
interconnector capacity. The rest of methods are called “remedial methods”, as they do not affect the 
market transactions directly but leave it to the TSOs to find a solution to congestion6.  
Under explicit auctioning, the TSOs of the systems between which congestion exists sell their 
interconnector capacity to the highest bidder. The explicit auctioning thus separates transactions in 
electricity from transactions in cross-border transmission capacity. Market splitting or implicit 
auctioning, integrates electricity and transmission markets. The existence of power exchange on each 
side of the interconnector is a necessary condition. Market splitting is today generally regarded as the 
most efficient and transparent congestion management method.  
While it can be shown that at least in theory all of the above five methods can achieve economic 
efficiency in the short run, their long term effects are quite different7. The congestion pricing methods 
send a price signal to market players indicating the cost of congestion, as a result of which market 
players have an incentive to relocate in a manner which reduces the congestion. The corrective 
methods do not send any price signal to market players, but provide the TSOs with an incentive to 
minimize congestion. Unfortunately, there is no workable solution available which combines the two 
types of incentives. Given the choice, the congestion pricing methods appear preferable, as it is more 
difficult to impact generators decisions about where to locate than it is to impact TSOs` development 
plans, as TSOs are already regulated monopolies.  
                                                     
6  Knops, H.P.A. , L.J. de Vries and R.A. Hakvoort, “Congestion management in the European electricity 
system: an evaluation of the alternatives”, submitted for publication in the Journal of Network Industries, 
May 2001. 
7  De Vries, L.J. and R.A. Hakvoort, “An economic assessment of congestion management methods”, 
submitted for publication in the Journal of Network Industries, May 2001. 
9 
3.2.2 Transmission losses 
Since electricity generation and power consumption take seldom place at the same location, electrical 
power transport is required. Such transport makes use of high voltage lines because high voltages limit 
transport losses (Coppens F., D.Vivet 2004), but even in that case losses are huge8. For reasons of 
security of supply, transport networks are meshed giving rise to the problem of so-called “loop flows”. 
Physical laws imply that electrical current follows the path of least resistance, so that power flowing 
through a meshed network follows a non-deterministic route. This implies that when a consumer and a 
generator contract for the delivery of a certain amount of power at a certain time of delivery, the 
consumer can never be sure that the power he consumes comes from the generator he contracted with. 
This is in strong contract to the transport of other commodities and has some complex side effects. 
Assuming that a consumer from one country concludes a contract with a producer of the other country 
for some amount of power in particular hour. The consumer will extract the contracted amount, and 
producer will inject it during that specific hour. However, due to the meshed European grid and to the 
electricity laws, the consumer will not receive the injected power of contracted party, but part of it will 
come from neighbouring generators. Some power will also be lost due to heat dissipation underway 
and these losses will have to be compensated by different European TSOs by injecting additional 
power (bought on balancing market). This loss compensation however entails costs for these TSOs. 
These costs can not be charged to any individual consumer of producer, because the 
consumer/producer can not be identified, so that these costs will have to be compensated out of a 
common fund collected through compensation mechanisms, called Cross-Border Trade (CBT) 
mechanisms. 
Cross-border trade (CBT) mechanism -When a generator and a consumer, located in different regions, contract 
for the delivery of electrical power, the physical characteristics of electricity transport imply that transport costs 
can not be charged to the parties involved in the transaction. As a consequence, the intermediate TSOs incur 
costs which they should be compensated for. The financial compensation of these costs is organized through the 
cross-border trading (CBT) mechanism. While TSOs, where the generator and the customer are located, will 
have to contribute to a common fund, other TSOs, that have to compensate losses and to manage loop flows, will 
have to be compensated for the incurred costs. In order to finance the cross-border costs, every TSO that 
participates in the CBT-mechanism contributes to a compensation fund, proportionally to the size of its net 
imports or exports. (Daxhelet O., Y.Smeers 2005). 
The fact that each intermediate TSO compensates part of the losses implies that power is never 
transported over very long distance and losses are relatively limited. However these losses are only 
limited when there are neighbouring generators in order to limit the transport distance to be covered. It 
is also worth mentioning that power transport infrastructure is capital-intensive and is characterized by 
high construction lead times. 
                                                     
8  It can be easily computed that, typically, on a 380kV line the power lost is around 0.5% per 100km under 
normal circumstances (i.e. with a 50% load factor). Thus if 500MW is transported over a 1000MW line, 
every 100km around 2.5MW is dissipated as heat. 
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3.2.3 Interconnection infrastructure 
For several years, numerous documents from the European Commission have been underlying the 
insufficiency of interconnection capacities between Member States, which is crippling the creation of 
an integrated European electricity market (Commission of the European Communities 2003). In 
particular, increased interaction capacity would correct the problems due to different national market 
structures, which are mostly concentrated. Than, this concentration could be solved by allowing 
competing imports from abroad.  
Many analysts argue that one of reasons why EU market is not yet integrated could be found in poor 
interconnection between Member States. In fact, EU electricity market should rather be seen as 
consisting of a core area (Germany, France, Benelux, Austria and Switzerland) and satellites with 
limited interconnection capacity (Ireland, UK, Scandinavian countries and Iberian Peninsula).  
The European Commission has taken a number of initiatives in order to improve this problematic 
situation. In particular, several critical bottlenecks have identified, where investments are a priority 
and are supported financially. In this respect, reference can be made to the interconnections between 
France, Germany and Benelux; between France and Spain; between Denmark and Germany; etc. 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005).  The interconnector capacities have already 
improved, but it will take quite a long time to realize the necessary investments. Another notable 
initiative was launched at the European Council of Barcelona, which set the target for Member States 
to have a level of electricity interconnection equivalent at least 10% of installed production capacity. 
The European Commission has recently emphasized the importance of developing regional markets as 
a necessary stage on the road to a European market (European Commission 2004; ERGEG press 
release PR-06-05). These regional markets would be organized of Member States at sufficient 
interconnection level. According to European Commission, these markets should include the Iberian 
market (Portugal and Spain), the West Europe market (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Suisse, 
and Netherlands), the Italian market and the Nordic market (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). 
These markets should develop a more harmonized approach to the degree of market opening, the 
setting of transmission tariffs or congestion management. For these purpose, the cooperation between 
institutions in neighbouring countries is needed (Jong J. 2004). 
3.3 Security of supply and distributed generation in de-regulated market 
The question of supply security has been much debated within economies undertaking electricity 
sector reform. Two issues are important, the securing of long-term supplies of generation fuels at 
favorable prices, and the reliability of the electricity system. The maintenance of adequate generation 
reserve capacity is a component of the system reliability concern.  
The introduction of competition into electricity generation results in strong pressure to reduce 
investment and operating costs. The incentives to avoid over-building and over-designing power 
plants, and to reduce operation and maintenance costs, raises the possibility that reserve capacities 
could drop to levels well below what is prudent to manage contingency situation. So arguments about 
reserve capacity must be considered as a component of long-term reliability, which requires the 
planning and the construction of enough aggregate capacity (generating and network) to balance total 
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demand and supply at prevailing prices at all times. Short-term reliability requires adequate reaction to 
load fluctuations over time scales ranging from microseconds to months.  
Once markets are deregulated, competition in the power sector puts strong pressure on generators to 
lower overall costs, including those associated with fuel inputs. Although the choice of input fuel for 
existing facilities may be constrained, there still exists inter-fuel substitution potential. Another 
possibility for lowering costs and increasing competitiveness is to increase the capacity factor 
(utilization rate) of a particular plant or plants, usually those are already cost effective in a deregulated 
market. 
Deregulated electricity markets, with the emphasis on cost structure, will tend to encourage investment 
in power generation plants that are least cost over the capital depreciation period. In most cases this 
will favour the lowest cost fuels, usually hydro where this is readily available, and gas because of new 
CCGT plants have relatively low capital cost, even if operating costs are somewhat higher. After 
majority of countries started renewable energy promotion, this became very attractive action for large 
industrials. Large industrials in fully competitive markets will invest in nuclear, because of the very 
high capital cost, and requirement for relatively large plant size. With respect to available technologies 
(hydro, gas, solar, wind) the future will likely see a large increase in smaller sized plants placed much 
closer to demand centers (encouraging the trend towards more highly distributed generation). 
As observed elsewhere in this chapter, electricity sector reform has happened in parallel with some 
important technological developments. The emergence of the CCGT as well as other developments 
reinforced a trend towards smaller scale, distributed power systems. Additionally, there are advances 
in fuel cell technology, wind turbines, and other smaller scale, clean power sources.  
4. DERREGULATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
It can without doubt be stated that climate change is one of the major issues of the new millennium. 
Reflecting the worldwide acknowledgment of the dangers of global warming, the Kyoto protocol was 
adopted in 1997 by member countries of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The Protocol’s major feature is that it sets mandatory targets for greenhouse gas 
emissions for those of the world’s leading economies which have signed the Protocol. These targets 
are ranged from –8% to +10% of the countries individual 1990 emission levels. The ultimate goal is to 
reduce the overall emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. 
For almost all countries – even those set at +10%, of 1990 levels – the limits call for significant 
reductions in projected emissions. Future mandatory targets are expected to be set for commitment 
periods beyond 2012.  
The European Commission launched its energy package in January 2007. The main aspect of the 
proposals is a binding target to slash the EU`s greenhouse gas emissions by 20% in 2020 compared 
with 1990 levels (EC, 2007a).  
With respect to the Kyoto protocol the European Union is seen as one zone, its reduction target being -
8%. This overall European reduction target was translated by the European Commission into national 
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reduction targets for each member state ranging from -28% for Luxembourg to +7% for Portugal9. 
This common target is divided among 15 Member States under a burden sharing agreement.  
Although there are noticeable variations from one country to another, due to the differences in 
production facilities, one could be noticed that electricity generation accounts for a significant share of 
greenhouse gas emission in the European Union, with an average of 26% of CO2 emissions in 200210. 
This automatically makes electricity one of the sectors in which action has to be taken in order to meet 
the protocol target. In this respect, the European Union has adopted a Directive on the promotion of 
electricity produced from renewable energy sources11.  To help reach its goal with least cost to society, 
the EU has chosen to make use of emission trading as complement to green electricity generation. 
These two approaches will be explained with more details in this section. 
4.1 Electricity generation using renewables 
Fossil fuels supply around 85% of the world’s commercial primary energy needs. Natural gas provides 
about 25% of this, and its share is growing. Power plants represent by far the largest group of coal end 
users, consuming 60% of the total world coal production to produce heat and generate electricity. 
Electric power sector emissions of carbon dioxide are almost 10% of the world total (Asia Pacific 
Report).  
Bernow et al (1998) argue that, “while there are potential environmental benefits from restructuring, 
the environmental threats appear larger”. From one point of view, the future looks relatively bright if 
gas combined cycle plants and other renewable energy based technologies replace coal-fired 
generation, leading to lower CO2 emissions. However, it is argued that capital –intensive renewables 
and end-use efficiency (which tends to have a long pay back period), will suffer due to the higher cost 
of capital, reflecting greater levels of perceived risk in the marketplace.  
The coal plants in some economies (especially pre-reform) suffer significant under-utilization, relative 
to their full availability. With relatively low coal prices, these plants have a significant competitive 
advantage in a wholesale electricity market. Increasing utilization of such plants would lead to 
significant increases in carbon emissions. Embedded technologies have an advantage over new and 
emerging ones – the physical stock and expertise are well entrenched, and investment risks are lower. 
These situations favour fossil fuels, especially in a situation where markets have systematically failed 
to account fully for the environmental costs.  
A wholesale electricity market is driven by costs of production, and is a market where the lowest cost 
generators – regardless of fuel type – will invariably be called first. If the lowest cost plants happen to 
run on the least environmentally friendly fuels, than in the absence of any mechanisms to limit 
emissions, overall emissions of environmentally harmful substances are bound to increase. 
                                                     
9  The US`s reduction target is -7%, Japan’s -6%, just as Canada’s. The Russian Federation has to stabilize its 
emissions (0%) and Australia is allowed to emit more (+8%). 
10  International Energy Agency (2004a). 
11  See Directive 2001/77/EC. In addition to the goal of meeting Kyoto protocol commitments, the Drective also 
aims at guaranteeing security of electricity supply, as green electricity is not dependent on imports. 
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As mentioned before in this section, the electricity generation accounts for a significant share of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the EU, with an average of 26% of CO2 emissions in 200212. Due to this, 
the green electricity has to be encouraged and Renewable Energy Sources (RES) are undergoing 
important developments at all levels in the European Union. The EU adopted in October 2001 a 
directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal 
electricity market. The aim of this directive is to promote an increase in the contribution of renewable 
energy sources in the energy supply.  
The directive seeks to increase the consumption of energy from renewables to 21% by 2010. Germany 
is one of the EU countries targeted with the 12.5% of use of RES, as well as UK whose target is about 
10%, Spain, whose target for RES is 29.4% and Latvia with 49.3%; just to mention some of them. 
National indicative targets were set and, in order to achieve them, Member States have developed a 
variety of support schemes aiming to encourage green electricity generating plants.  
Usually promoted market mechanisms to encourage green electricity generation are guaranteed prices, 
tradable green certificates or fiscal measures.  
4.1.1 Market mechanisms for RES promotion 
Generating electricity from renewables has a priority in the energy policy strategies. As White Paper 
on Renewable Sources of Energy and Proposal on the promotion of electricity from RES, published by 
European Commission, set challenging goals in the energy mix of European Union countries, a 
comprehensive range of measures is proposed to overcome barriers to the development of renewables. 
Historically, dissemination strategies for commercial electricity from RES have included various 
rebate programmes as major incentives, whereby purchasers of renewable energy generating plant 
could claim back (i.e. be rebated for) part of the costs by a government grant or from a government 
legislated levy. The most influential programmes were (a) the wind promotion programme in 
Denmark, and (b) the German “1,000 Roofs Programme” for promoting photovoltaic (PV) power, and 
(c) the tendering program within the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) in UK13.  In the early 1980s 
financial incentives, in the form of capital grants, loans or reduced taxes, were also good complement 
to encourage installation of generating plant. The most successful examples were in Germany and 
Denmark, where for instance, it was possible to obtain preferential real estate loans for wind turbine.  
In the mid-1990s, in various European countries, promotional programmes based on regulated tariff 
rates for the purchase of electricity from specified renewable sources become more common and were 
enhanced. The most important models in this context were enhanced Feed-In tariffs and rate-based 
incentives, as for all RES generators at fixed values in Denmark, Germany, Italy and Spain, and 
against competitive tendering in the UK14. 
                                                     
12  International Energy Agency (2004). 
13  Reviewed Report on Promotion Strategies for Electricity  from Renewable Energy Sources in EU countries”, 
Thomas Faber, John Green, Miguel Gual, Reinhard Haas, Claus Huber, Gustav Resch, Walter Ruijgrok, John 
Twidel; June 2001. 
14  The same as 8. 
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Perhaps the most significant opportunities for electricity from RES are coming with the increasing 
liberalization of electricity markets across Europe. Dissemination programmes for RES are being 
designed especially to fit within this liberalization.  Table 1 presents a classification of the existing 
strategies for encouraging electricity generation from renewables. To be more understandable what the 
main differences between proposed mechanisms are, each of presented ones will be explained with 
more details below. 
Voluntary approaches are based on the willingness to pay of private individuals or organizations, and 
commercial or industrial companies. Nowadays “Green tariffs” are the most common voluntary 
approach to promote electricity from RES. Consumers choose to either buy electricity at a utility green 
tariff, or from a Green Electricity supplier (if the customers are eligible). Usually the major feature of 
this type of financing program is that participants willingly pay a premium (i.e. surcharge) per kWh 
above regular tariff rates. The extra payments to the suppliers are passed to the renewable energy 
generators to meet the extra costs of generation, which are particularly associated with capital costs of 
the new plants. Green tariffs became popular in Germany, The Netherlands, the USA, but they are also 
offered in Austria, Finland, Sweden and the UK. 
Table 1: Classification of the existing strategies for RES promotion. 
Direct  
 Price-driven 
Capacity-driven 
Indirect 
Investment 
focused 
• Rebates 
• Tax 
incentives 
Regulatory 
Generation 
based 
• Feed-in 
tariffs 
• Rate-based 
incentives 
• Quota 
(RPS) / 
TGC 
• Bidding 
• Environme
ntal taxes 
Investment 
focused 
• Shareholder 
programmes 
• Contribution 
programmes 
Voluntary 
Generation 
based 
• Green tariffs 
 • Voluntary 
agreements 
Participation/shareholder Programmes has attracted attention mainly in Germany. The idea is to sell 
shares of a RES plant to private customers, with the customer becoming a shareholder of the company 
owning the renewable part. An example is the “Bürger für Solastrom” programme of Bayernwerke 
utility.  
Contribution programmes or donation programmes are organized in that way where subscribers 
contribute to a fund for renewable energy projects. It is an approach common for the promotion of PV 
systems in the public sector, e.g. schools. The projects developed are unrelated to the subscribers 
electricity usage. 
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Regulatory-price driven strategies, perhaps with financial incentives, aim to make investment in 
renewables more economically attractive. Fundamentally, there are two approaches to the provision of 
financial incentives: (i) investment in new capacity, and (ii) funding towards each unit of electricity 
produced. 
Usually used investment focused strategies are “rebates” and “tax incentives”. Several different 
options have been used to promote the generation of electricity from RES with fiscal instruments such 
as lower VAT-rate applied for RES-E systems and dividends from RES-Investment made exempt 
from income taxes. Both options have similar impact, acting as new investment subsidies for new 
installations. 
Generation based strategies usually used are “feed-in tariff” and “rate –based incentives”. A feed-in 
tariff is based on the price per unit of electricity that a utility or supplier has to pay for renewable 
electricity from private generators (also called producers). Thus, a government regulates the tariff rate. 
An intending producer is guaranteed the feed-in tariff for each unit of electricity exported to the grid if 
his form of generation meets the stated criteria; no bidding process or tendering is involved. 
Regulatory –capacity driven strategies using obligated quotas to introduce a certain amount of green 
electricity fall into two categories such as (i) those based on competitive tendering and trading, and (ii) 
those without specified competitive trading.  
The core principle of the tendering system is to invite developers to tender to construct a certain 
amount of renewable energy capacity. If the proposals are considered viable and competed 
successfully on price terms with other tenders within the same technology band, they are awarded a 
contract. A guaranteed surcharge per unit of output is guaranteed for the whole period of contract. 
Tradable Green Certificates programmes work as follows: a quantified obligation (quota) is imposed 
on one category of electricity system “operators” (generators, producers, wholesalers, retailers, or 
consumers) to supply or consume a certain percentage of electricity from renewable energy sources 
(RES). On a settlement date, the operators must submit the required number of certificates to 
demonstrate compliance. Certificates can be obtained in one of the following ways. First, operators 
can own their RE generation, and each defined amount of energy produced by these would represent a 
certificate. Second, operators can purchase electricity and associated certificates from eligible RES-E 
generators. Third, operators can purchase certificates without purchasing the actual power from a 
generator or trader or via a broker, i.e. certificates that are traded independent from the power itself. 
Due to competition on supply side, this system of tradable certificates leads, under the assumption of 
perfect market conditions, to minimal generation costs from RES. Of course, this happens only if there 
is a surplus of renewables generation above the demand for certificates. 
Aside from strategies which directly address the promotion of one or more specific renewable energy 
conversion technologies, there are other strategies which have an indirect impact on the dissemination 
of renewables such as taxes or permits on CO2 emission; fossil and nuclear subsidy reduction; eco-
taxes on electricity produced with non-renewable sources, etc. 
It can be seen that strategies for RES promotion shows that there is a wide range of possibilities to 
increase their dissemination. Yet, there are considerable differences in these strategies with respect to 
technical and economic efficiency, as well as with respect to their success in triggering a substantial 
number of new installations. Whichever strategy is chosen it should trigger and enhance competition 
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between generators, as well as between manufacturers. It should encourage renewable electricity 
suppliers to improve operation performance and technology efficiency.  
4.1.2 Emerging Technologies 
From a purely technical perspective, commercially available technologies exist to mitigate almost 
entirely the adverse impacts of all pollutants that result from the combustion of carbon intensive fossil 
fuels to generate electricity. The most intensive fuel is coal, and in many cases the addition of these 
technologies can be achieved without making coal uncompetitive with alternatives, such as natural gas 
or renewables.  
The importance of new and emerging technologies lie in the role of innovation as a means of 
increasing both economic and technical efficiency, and the growing requirement for cost-effective 
solutions to the greenhouse gas problem. This is where energy sector reform should have a very 
significant role to play. If, as expected, reform acts as a spur for technological innovation, we should 
see over the next few years significant advances with respect to improved goods and services, and in 
dealing with environmental impacts. 
The firms thrive on innovation, especially if incentives exist to encourage the penetration of new 
technologies into the marketplace. Incentives could include customer preferences to pay extra for 
added value (e.g. green electricity), or incentives created by the Governments through market-based 
policies and measures. On the energy scene, a significant number of environmentally responsive 
innovations are reaching the marketplace such as large-scale wind turbines, natural-gas fired or coal 
fired combine cycle turbines, photovoltaic cells, etc.  
4.2 Emission Trading Scheme 
The idea of emission trading as a cost effective way of reducing emissions of pollutants dates back to 
the 1960s. It was presented by Dales (1968), and formal proof of equilibrium was provided a few 
years later by Montgomery (1972). The first sophisticated emissions trading scheme implemented was 
in the United States` Acid Rain Program, which aimed at reducing emissions of nitrous oxides (NOx) 
and sulphur dioxide (SO2). The program has been a success; emission targets were reached sooner 
than expected and with less costs than predicted (Ellerman et al., 2003). 
The EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) began operation in 2005. The rules for the scheme are 
laid out in the emissions trading Directive 2003/87/EC, which came into force in October 2003. The 
Directive grouped the following industries under a cap-and-trade trading system: energy, metal, 
mineral, and pulp and paper. According to the Directive, these sectors must cover their yearly 
emissions of CO2 with a corresponding amount of allowances, of which one allowance equals one 
tone of carbon dioxide equivalent. From their issuance to the surrender date the allowances are 
transferable, and each transaction will be recorded in the national registries. The initial allocation of 
allowances is set out in the national allocation plans (NAP), in which each Member State declares the 
total amount of allowances to be allocated for each period and how this will be divided among the 
participating installations. According to the Directive, at least 95% of allowances shall be allocated 
free of charge for the period 2005-2007 (20003/87/EC). For the second period starting in January 2008 
the amount is reduced to 90% free allowances.  
17 
The sector whose share is the largest in terms of total emissions covered under the first phase of the 
EU ETS is the power sector. This sector represents over 50% of the total CO2 emissions covered by 
the scheme. The power sector differs from the others in that markets are not global due to non-
storability and transfer losses related to energy. Indeed, during times of congested transmission lines, 
electricity markets may be very local. Also, the emissions from energy production depend on the mix 
of generation technologies, which vary from country to country and provide differing possibilities for 
reducing emissions. These facts have raised the question of how emissions allowances and related cost 
could affect the price of electricity. Since the most EU-1515 countries the electricity markets are 
liberalized; price formation is no longer controlled by an authority. Electricity intensive industries now 
fear rising productions costs, as electricity producers are assumed to pass on the additional cost of 
carbon to consumer prices. 
The effect of emissions trading on the price of electricity is in principle rather simple. The introduction 
of emissions trading increases the cost of those production technologies that rely on carbon-based 
fuels. This affects the merit order; the ranking of producers by rising marginal production cost. A new 
merit order implies that the marginal, price setting technologies will change. It is therefore evident that 
there will be an impact on electricity prices.  
Since the adoption of the EU Directive on emission trading, a number of studies have emerged 
concerning the interaction of electricity markets and the EU ETS. Some are country specific, such as 
Kara et al. (2006) concerning Finland, Linares et al. (2006) concerning Spain and IPA (2005) 
concerning UK. Other studies, for example Sijm et al. (2005), Ilex (2004), and ECON (2004), cover a 
larger market area. In general, the studies suggest that a comprehensive answer to the question can not 
be given. For example demand patterns, the technology mix and the structure of the electricity market 
influence the passing on of additional costs from carbon. These are conditions which are specific for 
each market area. 
5. DIFFERENT MARKET STRUCTURE 
5.1 Vertical Integration Monopoly Model 
In this model there is no competition and no consumer choice. Typically this model is characterized by 
the existence of one vertically and horizontally integrated system. In some cases, a number of 
vertically –integrated monopolies may exist, but each has their own separate franchise area of 
operation – usually mandated in law. The monopoly utility owns and operates all generation plants, 
and transmission and distribution networks. It may be under an obligation to supply consumers, but 
consumers for their part are captive and have no choice of supplier. The service area may be national 
in coverage. The utility is usually also tightly regulated – usually through price control. 
Historically, this model developed as a logical way of dealing efficiently with a number of the rather 
unique characteristics of the electricity supply industry at a time when rapid industrialization required 
rapid growth in supporting infrastructure. 
                                                     
15  EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, france, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK. 
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Electricity is physically more complicated to deliver to final consumers than most other goods. 
Transmission requires split-second control to coordinate supply and demand at any moment. In the 
early days of development of an electricity structure, it was easy to imagine, and argue, that 
generation, transmission and distribution were intimately inter-related, were natural monopoly 
components of the overall supply system, and the best handled by a single monopoly structure. This 
approach also allowed for the construction of large-scale generation plants and transmission systems at 
a time when economies of scale were important in the industry. 
With technological advances allowing for the construction and sitting of smaller-scale generation 
plants closer to demand centers, advances in information technology, the deregulation and 
development of competition in other infrastructural industries, and the realization that the sale of the 
product can be speared from the means of transport, it has become increasingly difficult to sustain the 
argument that a vertically-integrated monopoly structure is the only way of structuring the electricity 
sector. 
Figure 1.Vertical Integration Monopoly Model. 
This model allows subsidies and cross-subsidies – as there is no competitive market – as 
well as investment in public goods such as rural electrification and distribution of power to 
poor communities. 
The shortfalls of a vertically-integrated monopoly structure have really only become evident 
in recent years, and in economies with relatively large and mature electricity supply 
industries.  
The major deficiencies of the vertical monopoly structure that have been identified include: a lack of 
incentives to improve services and lower costs; a lack of transparency; poor investment decision-
making; and political interference. 
Dismantling the above monopoly structure normally will involve separating out the potentially 
competitive generation, wholesaling and retailing elements from the natural monopoly elements of 
transmission and distribution. The difficulties in achieving this depends on who owns the assets to 
begin with, what regulatory regime will be instituted to deal with abuses market power, and what 
subsidies and cross-subsidies exist.  
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5.2 Wholesale market 
This model may be considered as a first step towards deregulation. At the beginning of model 
existence, one or several vertically integrated companies still controlled the sector, but some private 
investment was made possible by licensing Independent power Producers (IPPs) to build generation 
capacity. These might be created from existing utilities by divestiture, or they might be new producers 
who entered the market when new plant is needed.  
With this model it is possible to have competition in generation, but the vertically –integrated utility 
still has control over transmission and distribution. Retail consumers are still captive. The major 
advantage of this model is that it allows for direct inward investment by private investors, and allows 
investment risks to be shared. This model still allows governments to use the electricity industry to 
meet social policy obligations and create public goods, as there is no competitive market at the 
retailing level. 
Figure 2. Wholesale Competitive Model. 
As model progressed, distribution companies, that retail electricity to consumers, were 
allowed to choose their supplier. This brings competition into generation and wholesale 
supply. In this model, separate distribution companies purchase electricity from any 
competing IPP generator. The distribution companies maintain a monopoly over energy sales 
to the final customers. In this model an existing generation company has to compete against 
new entrants.  
The ability of governments to direct the choice of new generation technology is, by and large, no 
longer desirable or necessary. 
As there can now be a power pool or wholesale power market, it is possible to have a relatively 
competitive wholesale trading market, where the cost structure of generators is determined by the 
electricity wholesale price. It is still possible with this model, to have relatively few traders, and have 
“wheeling” contracts where distribution customers and generators make bilateral contracts to move 
power from one utilities` transmission system through that of its competitors.  
There is still monopoly market power in the sector, as final consumers still have no choice of supplier. 
This allows for the delivery of certain public goods at the retail level, and some subsidies can be 
maintained, although it limits the form in which they can be imposed. 
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As the choice of generation assets is left to the market, economic efficiency can be improved, and 
risks transferred from government to private investors. Although investors may seek long-term 
contracts before building generation capacity, the existence of a wholesale electricity market (which 
normally includes a spot market) means that such contracts are not essential.  
The importance of this model lies the fact that a decision to introduce wholesale electricity 
competition indicates that policy-makers have taken the important philosophical step of rejecting 
heavy handed regulation as an adequate tool to manage the sector, and have instead taken the leap of 
faith that competition can be introduced into the electricity supply industry, and that social and 
economic benefits will flow from this decision. 
This model represents only a partial step towards the introduction of competition in the electricity 
supply industry. Consumers are still captive, and so the full economic benefits of a fully deregulated 
market are not achieved. However, once the introduction of competition at the wholesale level has 
been achieved it becomes easier to devise the means to introduce competition at the retail level, and 
this step usually follows after the introduction of a wholesale market. 
5.3 Full Competitive Market 
In this model, competition has been introduced into all levels of the industry, ideally from wholesaling 
down to individual domestic consumers. A key component of this model is direct (or third party) 
access to transmission and distribution networks. With the right regulatory structure in place, any 
electricity consumer should theoretically be able to purchase from any retail supplier, who in turn is 
purchasing electricity from a competitive wholesale market. 
Ideally the network functions of transmission and distribution (natural monopolies) are completely 
separated from the functions of generation and retailing. Dispatch can be handled by the transmission 
network owner, but where more than one transmission networks exist, this is best handled by a TSO. 
With this structure, there should be free entry by firms into the competitive functions of generation 
and retailing. There are no permitting or licensing requirements. This allows anyone, including 
householders, to build their own generation plants.    
 
Figure 3. Full competitive market. 
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The advantage of this model is that it optimizes economic efficiency; at least once the regulatory 
regime has been optimized to minimize any market imperfections and control abuses of market 
power. 
The experiences of economies where this model has been introduced suggest that a number of 
benefits become obvious. Firstly, costs in the generation sector are driven down substantially, 
and this usually is expressed in lower retail tariffs. At the retail level, competition is beginning 
to become evident, with the range of goods and services being offered by electricity retailers 
increasing in both quantity and quality.  
The wholesale market operates as an auction, buyers and sellers meet and exchange goods on the basis 
of long-term (hedged) contracts and spot contracts. There is no single buyer. The operators of the 
market never own and never assume the market risk; they merely act as auctioneers, making their 
income from the transactions. 
As disadvantage the transaction cost could be considered. It can be argued that the transaction costs 
involved with managing the contracting aspects of this model are not negligible. The response to this 
that advances in material and information technologies reduce such costs sufficiently to ensure that the 
overall benefits of full electricity market competition outweigh the disadvantages of increased 
transaction costs. With this model, firms in the industry are free to engage in joint venturing, 
acquisitions and other market activities.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Electricity liberalization in Europe is part of the trend towards the deregulation of network industries 
around the world. Whereas empirical evidence generally suggest that deregulation has had a positive 
impact on efficiency and consumer welfare in other sectors (e.g. telecommunications, air travel, etc.), 
the results expected for the electricity sector are much more relative so far. Since only a few countries 
have fully completed their deregulation process, the available evidence is not yet sufficient to build a 
comprehensive judgment.  
For instance, increasing oil, gas and coal prices as well as the enforcement of the Kyoto protocol are 
responsible for much of the increase in bulk electricity prices, but, as that impact can not be quantified, 
it is also impossible to determine how prices would have moved otherwise, i.e. the real impact of 
deregulation. 
The problems are more related to the unusual characteristics of electricity as a product, which make 
the industry very different from other network industries: electricity is not storable, demand and 
supply must be constantly balanced, and demand is both volatile and inelastic. As a consequence, the 
traditional, market clearing mechanisms, such as delivery delay or substitution of other goods, are not 
available for electricity (NBB Working Paper 2006). This implies price volatility on power exchanges 
and makes the security of the system more vulnerable to climatic conditions. It also creates the need 
for heterogeneous production park with sufficient reserve generation capacity.  
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Although there is an economic choice for heterogeneous generation technologies, today’s 
heterogeneity in generation mix across European Union has been dictated by past national choices, 
based on a combination of economic, geographical, geopolitical and political consideration. The 
generation mix based on this has important consequence in deregulated markets: generators based in 
countries where the least costly techniques (i.e. nuclear and hydro power) are available enjoy a 
competitive advantage, which is strengthened when greenhouse gas emissions are internalized.  
In order to avoid a system breakdown, efficient coordination and the exchange of information are 
required between the various segments of the sector (i.e. generation, transmission, distribution, and 
supply). The unbundling of these segments, which is one of the central measures in the deregulation 
process, has complicated the achievement of this crucial requirement and entails a new type of costs – 
transaction costs – that might reduce the potential gains from the introduction of competition in 
generation and supply. 
As far as interconnection capacities between national markets are concerned, they are widely 
concerned as insufficient. This situation is retarding the creation of a single European market. More 
interconnection capacities would in many cases solve the problem of concentration on national 
markets. The European Commission has taken initiatives to improve this situation, such as financial 
support investments as well as promoting regional markets development as an interim stage on the 
road to a European market.  
It should be mentioned that power transport over long distances requires high infrastructure 
investments and is characterized by high operational costs (congestion management, loop-flow 
management, etc.). Since the cost being the sum of generation and transport costs, power generation 
will probably always be dispersed across Europe.  
The electricity industry is also at the crossroads of two important concerns, i.e. the enforcement of the 
Kyoto protocol and the security of supply. These two concerns were managed by governments through 
industry regulation and planning, the European policymakers tend to priorities the market as a way to 
solve them. For instance, the unequal national targets and use of different technologies, combined with 
the existence of entry barriers, might distort competition.  
In order to overpass some concerns related to the process of liberalization, firstly the regulatory 
framework needs to be harmonized. This is precisely the case of electricity deregulation, which has 
been and still is particularly subject to controversy between Member States. This situation has resulted 
in extensive freedom in terms of national implementation. The lack of harmonization is particularly 
harmful to the economic design of the market, this is for the degree of competition introduced, the 
handling of market power problems, etc.   
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